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VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) is a widely used cooperative inventory policy in supply chains in which 
each enterprise has its autonomy in pricing. This paper discusses a leader-follower Stackelberg game in a 
VMI supply chain where the manufacturer, as a leader, produces a single product with a limited production 
capacity and delivers it at a wholesale price to multiple different retailers, as the followers, who then sell the 
product in dispersed and independent markets at retail prices. An algorithm is then developed to determine the 
equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. Finally, a numerical study is conducted to understand the influence of 
the Stackelberg equilibrium and market related parameters on the profits of the manufacturer and its retailers. 
Through the numerical example, our research demonstrates that: (a) the market related parameters have 
significant influence on the manufacturer’ and its retailers’ profits; (b) a retailer’s profit may not be 
necessarily lowered when it is charged with a higher inventory cost by the manufacturer; (c) the equilibrium 
of the Stackelberg equilibrium benefits the manufacturer. 
Keywords: Supply chain; Vendor managed inventory; Stackelberg game 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Enterprises can be non-cooperative and cooperative in a supply chain since they individually try to maximize 
their own profits. For a VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) -type supply chain, the manufacturer and its 
retailers cooperate with each on their inventory control. The manufacturer decides on the appropriate 
inventory levels of each of the products for all enterprises, and the appropriate inventory policies to maintain 
these levels (Simchi-Livi et al. 2000). A VMI system has been widely adopted by many industries for years. 
The classical success story for VMI system is found in the partnership between Wal-Mart and Procter & 
Gamble (P&G). In 1985, the partnership had dramatically improved P&G’s on-time deliveries and Wal-
Mart’s sales, and both of their inventory turns also increased (Buzzell and Ortmeyer 1995). Besides retailing 
industries, VMI is adopted by leading chemical companies to increase supply chain efficiency and to enhance 
customer and supplier relationships (Challener 2000). High-tech industries such as Dell, HP and ST 
Microelectronics also operate efficient supply chains through VMI to reduce inventory levels and costs (Shah 
2002, Tyan and Wee 2003). In this system there are manufacturers ( P&G, Dell, HP etc.) and retailers, such as 
Wal-Mart, and all kinds of products sold, for example, HP selling printers, computers and scanners etc, P&G 
manufacturing cosmetics, household cleaners and paper products etc. 
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However, it should be noted that VMI represents partial cooperation in the sense that their cooperation 
focuses only on inventory control and there still exist some degrees of autonomies for the individual 
enterprises/players to respond to their changing environments. For example, individual enterprises still enjoy 
the rights of determining retail prices for retailers and wholesale price for the manufacturer. Thus the 
enterprises face a question: how does every individual enterprise give optimal decision with its autonomies in 
order to maximize its own profit in VMI system? At this point the non-cooperation then occurs under a VMI 
system when every individual enterprise maximizes its own profit. The question motivates us to research this 
kind of semi-cooperation supply chain. 
In the semi-cooperation setting, the competition among the different enterprises become inevitable, and 
the characteristic of the VMI setting will determine the game type among the enterprises. The characteristic of 
the VMI strategy is that the vendor generates the point of order decision and holds the ultimate inventory 
ownership. In order to make the strategy be implemented, under the VMI scheme, the vendor must have the 
capability to perform demand forecasting, and inventory management (Tyan and Wee 2003). Thus it is easy 
for the manufacturer to know the information of its retailers, and then anticipate the reaction of its retailers. At 
this point it is reasonable to assume that the manufacturer knows the information and reaction of its retailers, 
but the retailers do not know that of the manufacturer. The game approach addressing the kind of information 
asymmetry can be modeled as a Stackelberg game (see Chen et al. 2001a, Viswanathan and Wang 2003, etc.), 
where the enterprise who dominates the information of the system is considered as a leader, while the other 
enterprises are the followers. The followers’ reaction process is known to the leader. In the VMI system, the 
manufacturer dominating the information motivates us to research how the manufacture can take advantage of 
the information to improve its profit with Stackelberg game. The manufacturer is the leader who knows and 
can participates the reaction of each retailer to maximizing its own profit by determine the inventory strategy 
of the VMI system and its wholesale price. Each retailer, as a follower, does not know the reaction of the 
manufacturer, but takes the manufacturer’s decision results as input parameters to maximize its own profit by 
determining its retail price. 
This paper is concerned with such a VMI supply chain that consists of one manufacturer (vendor) and 
multiple different retailers with a single product. The manufacturer produces a single product with a limited 
production capacity and distributes it to its retailers. Each retailer buys the product from the manufacturer at a 
wholesale price, and then sells it to the consumer market at a retail price. Retailers’ markets are assumed to be 
dispersed and independent each other. In the supply chain, the manufacturer, as a leader, determines the 
wholesale price, inventory policy for the supply chain for maximizing its own profit, and each retailer, as a 
follower, in turn takes the manufacturer’s decision results as given inputs to determine the optimal retail 
prices for maximizing its own profits.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the relevant literature is briefly reviewed. Section 3 gives 
the problem description and notations to be used. Section 4 develops the game model while Section 5 analyses 
the Stackelberg equilibrium for the developed model. Section 6 derives a method for solving the Stackelberg 
equilibrium. Section 7 presents a numerical study and corresponding sensitive analysis for some selected 
parameters. 
 
2 Literature review 
 
This paper discusses the Stackelberg game in the supply chain where a manufacturer and multiple retailers 
maximize their own profits by determining their price strategies individually while inventory policies is 
cooperated with VMI strategy . So the research literature related to this paper can be divided into those on 
Leader-follower game in VMI system 
integrated supply chain inventory model, those on integrating marketing policies into inventory decisions, and 
those on Stackelberg games in supply chains. 
Early researches based on simple supply chain inventory involved a single vendor and single retailer, as 
used by Goyal (1977) for studying a joint economic lot size (JELS) model to minimize the total relevant costs. 
Banerjee (1986) generalized Goyal’s model (Goyal 1977) by incorporating a finite production rate for the 
vendor to obtain the optimal joint production or order quantity. Goyal (1988) extended Banerjee’s model 
(Banerjee 1986) again by relaxing the lot-for-lot production assumption and argued that the economic 
production quantity is an integer multiple of the buyer's purchase quantity and showed that its model provides 
a lower or equal joint total relevant cost. Kohli and Park (1994) investigated joint ordering policies as a 
method to reduce transaction costs between a single vendor and a homogeneous group of retailers. They 
presented expressions for optimal joint order quantities assuming all products are ordered in each joint order. 
Lu (1995) considered a one-vendor multi-buyer integrated inventory model and gave a heuristic approach for 
joint replenishment policy. Banerjee and Banerjee (1992) considered a VMI system in which the vendor 
makes all replenishment decisions for its buyers to improve the joint inventory cost. Woo et al. (2001) and Yu 
and Liang (2004a) extended their discussions to three level supply chain in which only one raw material is 
considered. Recently, VMI is widely studied by other researchers, such as Achabal et al. (2000), Dong and Xu 
(2002), Disney and Towill (2003), Toni and Zamolo (2005), and Rusdiansyah and Tsao (2005) etc. How to 
give an optimal inventory policy for maximizing the joint inventory cost is the main objective for these 
literatures. Note that in the above VMI setting (Woo et al. 2001, Yu and Liang 2004a, etc.), in order to 
streamline the supply chain, vendors are expected to synchronize its production cycles with buyers' ordering 
cycles, such as common replenishment cycles/epochs adopted (Viswanathan and Piplani 2001, Woo et al. 
2001, Mishra 2004, Yu and Liang 2004a, etc.), so that the total inventory cost for the entire chain can be 
reduced (Woo et al. 2001). 
Many researchers have considered how to integrate marketing policies into inventory control decisions. 
For example, Kotler (1971) incorporated marketing policies into inventory decisions and discussed the 
relationship between economic ordering quantity and price decisions for infinite time horizon. Ladany and 
Sternleib (1974) studied the effect of price variations on demand and consequently on EOQ (economic order 
quantity). Roslow et al. (1993) and Yu and Liang (2004b) studied co-op advertisement or pricing. Chen and 
Chen (2005) and Anjos et al. (2005) established a pricing and inventory policy that maximizes the revenue 
from selling a given inventory of items with continuous decay. These papers mainly discuss how the end 
market policies influence system wide profit to show the importance of market parameters. 
Stackelberg games for analyzing the game in supply chains are studied by quite a lot of researchers. In 
recent years, Weng (1995) studied the supply chain with one manufacture and multiple identical retailers, 
shows that Stackelberg game is used to guarantee perfect coordination considering quantity discounts and 
franchise fees. In the setting studied by Weng (1995), Chen et al. (2001a) showed that when the retailers are 
not identical, such a scheme is not guaranteed to perfectly coordinate the channel. They consider two 
Stackelberg games with the supplier as the leader and the retailers as followers. In one, the supplier sets a 
constant wholesale price, and in the other, the supplier offers an order-quantity discount scheme with one 
breakpoint. Viswanathan and Wang (2003) studied a similar setting with one manufacturer and one retailer by 
Stackelberg game with three price discount schemes, namely, (1) volume discounts, (2) quantity discounts, 
and (3) quantity discounts and simultaneous offer of volume discounts when demand is constant but price-
sensitive. It is shown that quantity discount schemes help the supplier achieve economies in order processing 
and inventory costs by encouraging buyers to increase the size of each of lot. However, quantity discounts 
tend to raise the cycle inventory of the supply chain. With demand that is price-sensitive, Qin et al. (2006) 
considered volume discounts and franchise fees as coordination mechanisms in a system consisting of a 
supplier and a buyer. The problem is analysed as a Stackelberg game. The competition/coordination 
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mechanism in supply chains with Stackelberg game was also discussed by Huang and Li (2001), Viswanathan 
and Rajesh (2001), Chen et al. (2001b), Sarmah et al. (2005) , and Parlar and Weng (2006) etc. A critical 
assumption made throughout this literature, though, is that the supplier has full information, and can design 
the quantity discount/franchise scheme without giving a reasonable reason. Most of these researchers took 
quantity discounts or/and franchise fee with a contract as incentive schemes s to influence buyers’ ordering 
behaviour, thus reducing the supplier’s (and the total supply chain’s) costs. In the above literature, none of 
them take the wholesale price and retail price as a decision variables in the setting with one vendor and 
multiple different retailers. The game in VMI system is few concerned. 
 
3 Problem description and notations 
 
3.1 Problem description 
 
In this paper, we consider one manufacturer and multiple retailers in a VMI setting in which: 
(1) The manufacturer produces one type of product with a limited production capacity, and supplies it to 
its multiple retailers. 
(2) The retailers are geographically dispersed to serve the markets in their own regions. The demand 
function for every retailer is the decreasing and convex function with respect to its retail price. 
(3) The manufacturer is a leader in the supply chain. The retailers’ response is available to the 
manufacturer (vendor) who determines the inventory replenishment plan and wholesale price. The 
manufacturer produces the product with fixed product rate and its production capacity is limited. 
(4) The retailers are assumed to be followers in the supply chain. However, they have the right to make 
decisions on their own retail prices. 
(5) The manufacturer is responsible for the chain-wide inventory control with the policy of VMI in which 
the manufacturer provides the product to its multiple retailers with a common replenishment cycle, 
and thus incurs all inventory related costs in order to eliminate the influence of the variations of the 
common replenishment cycle and backorder rate of every retailer on its retailers. Each retailer bears 
some inventory cost by repaying it to the manufacturer, and the cost for each retailer is in direct 
proportion to its demand rate. The inventory cost per unit is a constant that is previously negotiated by 
the manufacturer and its retailers. 
 
3.2 Notations 
 
Parameters Definition 
m  Total number of retailers 
i  Index of retailers or markets, 1, 2,...,i m=  
ib  Fraction of backlogging per unit time for retailer i , decision variables for the manufacturer 
C  Common replenishment cycle time for the product, decision variable for the manufacturer 
(time) 
pc  Wholesale price of the product determined by the manufacturer, decision variable for the 
manufacturer ($/unit) 
Leader-follower game in VMI system 
mc  Production cost per unit product ($/unit) 
pIR  Inventory cost for the manufacturer managing all retailers’ product inventory ($/time) 
( )i iD p  Demand rate in the market i  per unit time served by retailer , a decreasing function of  i ip
ib
H  Holding cost paid by the manufacturer to manage retailer i ’s inventory ($/unit/time) 
pH  Holding cost at the manufacturer’s side ($/unit/time) 
iK  Constant in the demand function of retailer i  
ib
L  Backorder cost paid by the manufacturer to market  ($/unit/time) i
ip  Retail price charged by retailer i  ($/unit), decision variable for retailer i  
P  Production rate for the manufacturer, which is a known constant and 
1
( )m i ii D p P= ≤∑  
ibS  Fixed cost paid by the manufacturer for managing retailer ’s inventory ($ per order) i
pS  Fixed order cost in a common replenishment cycle time for the manufacturer producing the 
product ($ per setup) 
iφ  Transportation cost shipped from the manufacturer to retailer i  ($/unit) 
iζ  Inventory cost paid by retailer i  ($/unit/time) 
x  Binary variable to indicate whether the production capacity of the manufacturer is abundant, 
1x =  indicating that the capacity is surplus and vice versa  
PTIC  Total inventory cost for the product ($/time) 
pTIDC  Total indirect cost for the product ($/time) 
pTDC  Total direct cost for the product ($/time) 
ib
NP  Net profit for retailer i  ($/time) 
mNP  Net profit for the manufacturer ($/time) 
 
3.3 Game model 
 
This section models the leader-follower relationship between the manufacturer and the retailers as a 
Stackelberg game with the manufacturer as the leader and retailers as its followers. In this game, the 
manufacturer maximizes its net profit by giving its optimal wholesale price and inventory control policy for 
the VMI system. All retailers decide their optimal retail prices to maximize their own net profits. 
Here we consider a two-echelon supply chain with a supplier distributing a single product to m separated 
retailers who in turn sell the product on their own markets. The demand at each retailer is described by a 
general demand function of the retail price. The demand functions are, almost invariably, downward sloping 
and a convex function with respect to ip . We have 
 ( ) 0i i
i
D p
p
∂ <∂  and 
2
2
( ) 0i i
i
D p
p
∂ >∂ . (1) 
This common demand function can go back to Samuelson (1947), see also Vives (1990) and often be 
described as Cobb-Douglas demand function as follows: 
 , (2) ( ) 1, 2,...,pi
e
i i i iD p K p i m
−= =
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in which iK  and represents the market scale of retailer i  and the demand elasticity of retailer i  with 
respect to its retail price respectively. Following the problem description that  is a decreasing and 
convex function in the 2
ip
e
( )i iD p
nd point in Subsection 3.1, we have e . 0
ip
>
It is assumed that the supply chain adopts a VMI strategy where the manufacturer is responsible for the 
chain-wide inventory control and each retailer pays its inventory cost again to the manufacturer in proportion 
to its demand rate  and thus the inventory cost per unit that is a constant iD iζ   negotiated by the 
manufacturer and its retailers. Retailer i ’s inventory cost then is 
1, 2,...i = m
( )i i iD pζ . Retailer i ’s product procurement 
cost is  and the revenue is ( )p i ic D p ( )i i ip D p . Therefore, the net profit for retailer i  is given as Equation (3):  
 ( )bi i p i i iNP p c D p( )ζ= − − . (3) 
Consider the transfer payment from a retailer to the manufacturer in our model. According to the 5th point 
of the problem description in Subsection 3.1, the payment consists of two components; a wholesale price  
and an inventory charge 
pc
iζ . The reason is that a) any VMI system, of course including our VMI setting, is 
established under the setting that the manufacturer and its retailers have the long time cooperation of 
inventory control. In this case, it is not acceptable for a retailer to buy its product from the manufacturer at a 
higher price than that of the other retailers. The manufacturer must sell the same product at the same price to 
its retailers. So the first component, the wholesale price, as the manufacturer’s decision variable, occurs. b) 
The second component iζ  occurs in our manuscript is also necessary since each retailer may have differences 
each other, such as inventory holding cost, ordering cost and demand rate, distance etc. So for the 
manufacturer, it is reasonable to charge different inventory costs from different retailers according to their 
inventory condition and demand rate.  
After the net profit function for individual retailers is established as above, let us consider the net profit 
function for the manufacturer. Consider the components of the total inventory cost first. Figure 1 shows the 
inventory levels for all retailers and the manufacturer. As indicated in the 5th point of the problem description 
in Subsection 3.1, the inventory cost spent for all retailers consist of two parts, one is paid by all retailers and 
the other is paid by the manufacturer. According to the given VMI policy, retailer i  pays inventory cost by 
demand rate only, that is ( )i i iD pζ , and the manufacturer pays the rest of the total inventory cost. So what the 
manufacturer spent is equal to abstracting the inventory cost paid by all retailers from that paid by the whole 
VMI system. To manage the product inventory in retailer i , VMI system spends  on fixed order cost, 
=  on holding cost, and L D  
on backorder cost per unit time according to Figure 1. Thus the inventory cost for the manufacturer managing 
all retailers’ product inventory is given by Equation 
/
ib
S C
( ( )(1 ) )((1 ) )/2
ib i i i i
H D p b C b C− − 2 2( )(1 ) /2
ii i i b
D p b C H− ( ( ) )( )/2
ib i i i i
p b C b C 2 2( ) / 2
ii i i b
D p b C L=
(4): 
 
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
( )(1 ) ( )1 [ ]
2 2i i i
m m m m
i i i i i i
p b b b i i
i i i i
D p b C D p b C ( )iRI S H L DC
ζ
= = = =
−= + + −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ p . (4) 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The manufacturer’s capacity is limited and produces the product with a fixed production rate. When the 
sum of all retailers’ demand rate is less than the production rate, it means that capacity is redundant and the 
production process is not continuous. The setup cost occurs at every beginning of the common replenishment 
cycle, and 1x = . Otherwise  and the production capacity is used up. The whole production process 
being continuous without production setup cost . Thus, the manufacturer’s total inventory cost at its own 
side for the product can be expressed by Equation 
0x =
pS
(5): 
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2 2
1
( )1 [ ]
2
m
i i
p p p
i
D p CTIC x S H
C P=
= ⋅ + ∑ . (5)
The total indirect cost of the manufacturer is rearranged in Equation (6): 
 . p pTIDC TIC RI= + p
i
(6)
The direct cost per unit time which consists of manufacturing cost and transport cost is formulated in 
Equation (7): 
 
1
( )( )
m
p i i m
i
TDC D p c φ
=
= +∑ . (7)
As the total revenue for the manufacturer is given as 
1
( )m i i pi D p c=∑ , its net profit can be determined by 
 . 1 2
1
( , ,... , , , ) ( )
m
m m p i i p p
i
NP b b b C c x D p c TDC TIDC
=
= − −∑ p
p
(8)
We have now obtained the net profit functions for the retailers and the manufacturer in Equations (3) and 
(8) respectively. Then the lead-follower relationship for the manufacturer and its retailers can be formulated 
as the Stackelberg game model below:  
  
1 2
1 2, ,... , , , 1
max ( , ,... , , , ) ( )
m p
m
m m p i i p pb b b C c x i
NP b b b C c x D p c TDC TIDC
=
= − −∑ (9)
         subject to 
 
1
( ( ))
m
i i p
i
D p c P
=
≤∑ , (10)
 
1
( ( ))
m
i i p
i
P D p c x
=
M− ≤ ⋅∑ , (11)
 0 1,   i=1,2, ,mib≤ ≤ K , (12)
 ; pC 0,c 0  =0 or 1x≥ > (13)
 max ( ) ( ) 1,2, ,
i
i
b i p i i ip
NP p c D p i mζ= − − = L   (14)
          subject to 
 ,    1, 2, ,i p ip c i mζ≥ + = … , (15)
 . ( ) , 1, 2, ,piei i i iD p K p i m
−= =  …
>
(16)
Here Equations (10) and (11) indicate that the capacity for the manufacturer; when the production 
capacity is enough, , and 
1
( ( )) 0
m
i i p
i
P D p c
=
−∑ 1x =  is satisfied by Equation (11); and vice versa. That is, 
when the capacity of is insufficient with 
1
( ( )) 0
m
i i p
i
P D p c
=
− =∑ , then 0x =  can be satisfied by the optimal 
solution of the model since it will make  decrease and  increase. Equation pTIDC mNP (15) gives the least 
acceptable price for retailer i  since i pp c iζ< +  will make 0biNP < . 
The game mechanism: the manufacturer is treated as the leader who first determines the common 
replenishment cycle, the backorder fraction and wholesale price, etc. The retailers are treated as the followers 
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who take the manufacturer’s decision results as the given input parameters in determining the retail prices ip  
 in their markets when they maximize their net profits respectively. The results of the retailers 
then influence the net profits of the manufacturer. Then the manufacturer adjusts its optimal decisions in order 
to maximize its net profit. The process continues until the manufacturer can’t increase its profit by changing 
its decision variables, and then the equilibrium, called Stackelberg equilibrium, obtained. That is to say, 
during this process, as the leader in the game, the manufacturer knows all retailers’ reactions and therefore 
considers them when it maximizes its profit by working out the common replenishment cycle C , the 
backorder fraction  , wholesale price  and 
1, 2, ,i = … m
mib 1, 2, ,i = … pc x . Every retailer takes the manufacturer’s results 
as its input parameters in determining its retail price ip  1, 2, ,i m= … . 
 
4 Analysis of the Stackelberg equilibrium 
 
From the game mechanism in the preceding section, in order to determine the Stackelberg equilibrium, we 
first solve the reaction functions of all retailers in the lower level of the proposed Stackelberg game model, 
and then give the manufacturer’s optimal decisions considering the reaction functions of its retailers. 
 
4.1 The retailers’ reactions  
 
Let us replace  in Equation ( )i iD p (14) with Equation (16), and we obtain Equation (17): 
 . max ( ) 1,2, ,pi
i
e
bi i p i i ip
NP p c K p i mζ −= − − = L (17)
Taking the first derivative of Equation (17) with respect to  as follows: ip
 
( 1)
(1 ) ( ) 1, 2, ,p pi i
i i
e ebi
p i i p p i i i
i
NP e K p e c K p i m
p
ζ− − +∂ = − + + =∂ L . (18)
If 0 1 , , the optimal solution is  at . 
ip
e< ≤ / >
ib i
NP p∂ ∂ 0
ib
NP → +∞ ip →+∞
This is impractical. Therefore, we must ignore the situation where 0 < ≤ 1. Let us focus on the situation 
where >1 by setting Equation 
ip
e
ip
e (18) to zero, we obtain Equation (19): 
 *
( )
1,2, ,
1
i
i
p i p
i
p
c e
p i m
e
ζ+= =− L . (19)
From Equation (19), it can be seen that retail i ’s price is determined by its price elasticity , wholesale 
price  and inventory cost per unit 
ip
e
pc iζ . Since > 1, ipe
 *
( )
( ) 1,2, ,
1
i
i
p i p
i p i
p
c e
p c i
e
m
ζ ζ+= > + =− L . .(20) 
This indicates that Equation (15) is satisfied naturally for a retailer to maximize its net profit. 
By substituting (19) into (17) and rearranging the result, we have 
 
( ) ( )
( )( )
1 1
pi i i
i
i i
ep i p p i p
b i p i
p p
c e c e
NP K c i m
e e
1,2, ,
ζ ζζ −+ += − − =− − L . (21) 
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4.2 The manufacturer’s decisions 
 
The manufacturer determines the optimal common replenishment cycle C  for the VMI system, wholesale 
price , and the backorder fraction  etc. to maximize its own net profit subject to the constraints imposed 
by Equations 
pc ib
(10)-(13), considering the retailers’ reaction Equation (19). Hence, substituting Equation (19) to 
Equation (9) the manufacturer’s model can be formulated as 
 . 
1 2
*
, ,... , , , 1
max ( )
m p
m
m i i p pb b b C c x i
NP D p c TDC TIDC
=
= − −∑ p (22)
subject to: (10)-(13) and (19). 
Since x  is a binary variable, so the Stackelberg game model can be discussed with 1x =  and 0x =  
separately. Firstly we analyse the model with 1x =  from Equations (23) to (29) below. 
When 1x = , because the second derivative of (22) with respect to  ib 1, 2, ,i m= …  is negative, we have 
 
2
1 2 *
2
( , ,..., , , )
( )( ) 0
i i
m m p
i i b b
i
NP b b b C c
CD p H L
b
∂ = − +∂ <
p
. (23)
Thus,  is a concave function of  for any other given  and 
. 
1 2( , ,..., , , )m mNP b b b C c ib 1 2 1 1, ,..., , ,..., ,i i mb b b b b C− +
pc
Set the first derivative of (22) with respect to  equal to zero, then  can be obtained as ib ib
 * 1,2, , .i
i i
b
i
b b
H
b i
H L
= =+ L m
m
m
i
NP C c D p c c
 (24)
It can be seen that   is in the feasible area of the manufacturer’s model. And  
 is the optimal solution of the manufacturer. 
*0 1ib< < 1, 2, ,i = L *ib
1, 2, ,i = L
By substituting (24) into (22) and rearranging the result, we obtain 
*
1
( , ) ( )( )
m
m p i i p i m iζ φ
=
= + −∑ −
1
1 [ ]
i
m
p b
i
S S
C =
− +∑ ** 2
1 1
( )( )[ ]
2
i i
i i
m m
i i b bi i
p
i i b b
D p L HD pC H
P L H= =
− + +∑ ∑ . (25)
The second derivative of (25) with respect to C is 
 
2
2 3
1
( , ) 2 [ ]
i
m
m p
p b
i
NP C c
S S
C C =
∂
0= − +∂ ∑ <
p
∂
. (26)
( , )mNP C c  is a concave function of C for any given . pc
Thus, from , the optimal value of  is obtained as ( , ) / =0m pNP C c C∂ *C
 * 1 ** 2
1 1
2( )
( )( )
i
i i
i i
m
p b
i
m m
i i b bi i
p
i i b b
S S
C
D p L HD pH
P L H
=
= =
+
=
+ +
∑
∑ ∑
. (27)
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In the radical sign of Equation (27), the denominator,   is 
composed of the items , 
* 2
1
( ( ) ) /
m
p i i
i
H D p P
=
∑ *
1
( ) /( )
i i i i
m
i i b b b b
i
D p L H L H
=
+ +∑
*( )i iD p ibL  and ibH  etc. and the numerator is composed of setup costs  and . 
This is similar to that of the EOQ model in terms of overall demand rate and relevant cost components; The 
optimal  increases when , 
pS ibS
*C *( )i iD p ibL  and ibH  go up, whereas decreases with the increase of  and . pS ibS
Substituting (27) into (25), the manufacturer’s net profit becomes 
 *
1
( ) ( )( )
m
m p i i p i m i
i
NP c D p c cζ φ
=
= + − −∑ ** 2
1 1
( )( )2 ( )(i i
i
i i
m m m
i i b bi i
p p
i i ib b
D p L HD pH S
P L H= = =
− + + 1 )bS+∑ ∑ ∑ . (28)
Equation (28) is a continuous function of variable cp. Since the capacity of the manufacturer is enough 
( 1x = ) and the maximal of (28) does exist, the optimal cp to maximize (28) is to satisfy  
 
( )
0m p
p
NP c
c
∂ =∂ . (29) 
Let us denote the solution of Equation (29) that maximizes Equation (28) as . *pc
From the analysis from Equation (23) to (29), all optimal variables are determined with 1x = . Now we 
discuss the optimal results with . 0x =
When , Equations 0x = (10) and (11) are equivalent to  considering the react function 
of Equation 
*
1
( ( ))
m
i i p
i
P D p c
=
= ∑
(19). There is only one variable solution  in  since pc
*
1
( ( ))
m
i i p
i
P D p c
=
= ∑
 
* *
1
( ( )) ( )( ) 0
m
i i p i pi i i
p i
d D p c dp cdD p
dc dp dc
=
p
= <∑ . (30) 
The only solution is denoted by  here.  minpc
Through the similar analysis we can obtain optimal  which is the same as Equation *ib (24) and  
 * 1 * min* min 2
1 1
2( )
( ( ))( ( ))
i
i i
i i
m
b
i
m m
i i p b bi i p
p
i i b b
S
C
D p c L HD p c
H
P L H
=
= =
=
+ +
∑
∑ ∑
, (31) 
which is similar to Equation (27) with . Then the manufacturer’s net profit is obtained as * * min(i i pp p c= )
 min * min min
1
( ) ( ( ))( )
m
m p i i p p i m i
i
NP c D p c c cζ φ
=
= + − −∑ * min* min 2
1 1
( ( ))( ( ))
2 ( )( )i i
i
i i
m m
i i p b bi i p
p b
i i b b
D p c L HD p c
H S
P L H= =
− + + 1
m
i=
∑ ∑ ∑ . (32) 
From the above analysis, we can obtain the algorithm steps to calculate the equilibrium of the Stackelberg 
game as the following section. 
 
5 Algorithm steps for Stackelberg equilibrium 
 
Leader-follower game in VMI system 
With the above analysis, this section presents an algorithm for solving the Stackelberg game model with the 
following steps: 
Step 1: Calculate the minimal  by  and substitute  into Equation minpc
*
1
( ( ))
m
i i p
i
P D p c
=
= ∑ minpc (32) to calculate 
the corresponding  with . In this case the manufacturer’s production capacity is used up. min(m pNP c )
n
0x =
Step 2: Calculate the optimal  by Equation *pc (29). If , substitute  into Equation 
* mi
p pc c> *pc (28) to calculate 
the corresponding  with *( )m pNP c 1x = . In this case the manufacturer’s production capacity is redundant and 
we go to Step 3. Otherwise we go to Step 4.  
Step 3: Compare  with . If  is larger than , then go to Step 4, otherwise 
go to Step 5. 
min(m pNP c ) )
*( )m pNP c
min(m pNP c
*( )m pNP c
Step 4: The optimal x  and  are 0  and  respectively. Substitute  into pc
min
pc
min
pc (24), (31), (19) and (21) to 
calculate optimal ,ib pc ,  and  respectively. ip ibNP
Step 5: The optimal x  and  are 1  and  respectively. Substitute  into pc
*
pc
*
pc (24), (27), (19) and (21) to 
calculate optimal ,ib pc , ip  and  respectively. ibNP
Step 1 and Step 2 are to calculate two candidate results of the manufacturer’s maximum net profit. In Step 2 
the manufacturer lacks of capacity with  and the optimal  will be  in Step 1 with * mp pc c≤ in pc minpc 0x =  since 
there is no  in that case. In Step 3, the larger  is selected as the final optimal results by the 
manufacturer maximizing its profit since the manufacturer is the leader and prefers a larger profit. Step 4 and 
Step 5 calculate the other optimal results of all retailers and the manufacturer under two kinds of settings; 
 and 
pS mNP
0x = 1x =  respectively. 
 
6 Numerical example 
 
This section presents a numerical example to the proposed game model. Here one manufacturer and three 
retailers are selected. The related input parameters for the base example are =1.4, =1.3, =1.5,
1p
e
2p
e
3p
e
1b
H =6, 
2b
H =6, 
3b
H =6, = , = , = , 1K
62 10× 2K 62.5 10× 3K 61.5 10× 1bL =300, 2bL =300, 3bL =300, =50, =50, 
=50, 
1b
S
2b
S
3b
S 1φ =5, 2φ =5, 3φ =5, 1ζ =7, 2ζ =7, 3ζ =7, =150, mc pH =3, =150, =200. The base example shows 
that retailer 1’s market is worse than retailer 2’, but better than retailer 3’. By applying the above solution 
procedure in Section 6, the corresponding results for the base example and sensitivity analysis with some 
selected parameters are shown in Table 1. The following are only a few interesting observations derived from 
Table 1 although many more can be obtained.  
pS P
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
1. The market related parameters have significant influence on the manufacturer’ and all retailers’ profits. For 
example, when  increases from 1.4 in the base example to 1.5, the manufacturer’s and retailer 1’s profits 
go down from 68255 to 60090 and 66808 to 31728, decreased by 11.96% and 52.51% respectively. However 
1p
e
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retailer 2’s and 3’s profits remain relatively stable, going up slightly from 181391 to 182806 and 23490 to 
23796, increased by 0.78% and 1.3% respectively. It can be seen that retailer 1’s related parameters have a 
significant influence on its own profit, and then on its vendor’s/the manufacturer’s profit. The other retailers’ 
profit is not much influenced. 
2. Retailer 1’s parameters not only have impacts its own retail price and the manufacturer’s wholesale price, 
but also on the other dispersed retailer’s retail prices via the change of the manufacturer’s decisions. For 
example, if  increases from  in the base example to , retailer 1 changes its retail price from 
original 2114 to 1924, and the manufacturer decreases its wholesale price from 597.11 to 542.63, deduced by 
9.12%, and this reduced wholesale price then makes retailer 2 and retailer 3 have the opportunity to decrease 
their retail prices, from 2618 to 2382 and 1812 to 1649 respectively. The improvement of the retailer 1’s 
market makes the manufacturer change its market strategy from the strategy of high price with low demand 
rate to that of low price with high demand rate. The change of the strategy not only lets retailer 1 and the 
manufacturer enjoy the increased profits, but also lets the other retailers benefit from added profits from the 
decreased wholesale price from 597 to 543. 
1K
62 10× 63 10×
3. In VMI system, the inventory cost iζ  1, 2,...,i m=  per unit paid by retailer i  is decided by the negotiation 
between retailer i  and the manufacturer. At the first glance, the manufacturer would get more profit with the 
increase of iζ  . Here the result from the example is opposite. When 1, 2,...,i m= 1ζ  increases from 2 to 12, 
retailer 1 is willing to pay more inventory cost for per unit product, then enhances its retail price from 2102 to 
2127, and then its net profit decreases from 66972 to 66644. In order to cope with this kind of change, the 
manufacturer takes the measure f reducing the wholesale price from 598.43 to 595.83, and its profit also 
decreases from 68263 to 68248. That is to say, an unreasonable value for iζ  1, 2,...,i m=  in VMI system may 
cause both manufacturer’s and retailer i ’s profits to drop. This has the important managerial insight that the 
manufacturer ought to treat iζ  i  as market policy carefully to maximize their profits. 1, 2,..., m=
i b bH L= + 1, 2, , m= L
4. The mutual competition or promotion exists among retailers. For example, from the first conclusion, when 
 increases from 1.4 in the base example to 1.5, retailer 1’s profit goes down from 66808 to 31728, reduced 
by 52.51%, but retailer 2’s and 3’s profits go up from 181391 to 182806 and 23490 to 23796, increased by 
0.78% and 1.3% respectively. That is, the mutual competition among retailers occurs at this setting. However, 
with the improvement of  increasing from  in the base example to  the mutual promotion 
occurs; since three retailers get added profits, from 66808, 181391 and 23490 to 104073, 186608 and 24627, 
increased by 55.78%, 2.88% and 4.84% respectively. 
1p
e
1K
62 10× 63 10×
5. From b H  i , it can be drawn that  is only influenced by * /( )
i i ib
*
ib ibH  and ibL , which 
also can be seen from Table 2. When 
1b
L  decreases from 300 to 10, the backorder fraction increases 
significantly from 1.96% to 37.50%. 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In the leader-follower game, the manufacturer maximizes its profit considering the retailers’ maximizing 
their own profits. In order to illustrate the validity of the leader-follower game to the manufacturer, with the 
given parameters for the base example, we assume that the manufacture only negotiate a wholesale price with 
its retailers at a fixed value. As an illustration, we fix the wholesale price at different levels between 200-
1000, calculate the corresponding results, and compare them with that of the base example, as shown in 
Figure 2. The series denoted by  and  in Figure 2 represent the manufacturer’s net profits 
corresponding to different fixed wholesale price, the base example respectively. “Decrease” represents the 
profit reduction and is measured by ( - )/  
_m currentNP _m baseNP
_m baseNP _m currentNP _m baseNP 100%× . From Figure 2, we conclude that:  
Leader-follower game in VMI system 
(a) The leader-follower game benefits the manufacture in VMI setting; the deviation of wholesale price from 
the optimal point 597.11 will bring a loss to the manufacturer. For example, when =200, the decrease of 
the manufacturer’s profit is up to 85%.  
pc
(b) For a given deviation of the wholesale price from 597.11 (the Stackelberg equilibrium), the minus 
deviation has greater influence on the manufacturer’s profit than that of the plus deviation. For example, 
setting the deviation=200, the manufacturer’s profit decreases around 27% at  = 397.11, while it decreases 
only around 2% at  = 797.11. 
pc
pc
 
7 Conclusion 
 
This paper has discussed a VMI supply chain where a manufacturer and multiple retailers play a game with 
each other under the partial cooperation in the inventory control with VMI policies in order to determine 
mutually optimal product marketing (retail price and wholesale price) and inventory policies by maximizing 
their individual net profit. The retailers determine the optimal local retail prices and the manufacturer gives its 
wholesale price and the product’s inventory replenishment in the supply chain level. This supply chain 
problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer is the leader and retailers are 
followers. An algorithm has been proposed to solve this game model. A numerical study is conducted to 
understand the Stackelberg equilibrium and significant influence of market related parameters on optimal 
policies and profits of the manufacturer and its retailers. The result of numerical example also shows that: (a) 
the competition or promotion still exists among the different retailer’s markets via changed wholesale price 
even if they only sale the product in dispersed and independent product markets; (b) the Stackelberg 
equilibrium benefits the manufacturer; any deviation of the manufacturer from the equilibrium will bring a 
loss to the manufacturer. 
However, this paper has the following limitations which may be extended in further research. The paper 
does not consider the horizontal competition among different retailers with one retailer’s demand is the 
function of the other retailers’ retail prices. Secondly, although the Stackelberg equilibrium benefits the 
manufacturer’s profit, it can not guarantee that the system-wide profit is maximized. Thirdly, only a single 
product is assumed in the discussion. It is more realistic to include multiple product variants of a single 
product family. Finally, this paper has focused on a supply chain dominated by a manufacturer. Many supply 
chains may be dominated by retailers and the manufacturer may be just a follower. This is an interesting 
scenario for further research. 
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Table 1. The results for the manufacturer and its three retailers 
Parameters *
1b  
*
2b  
*
3b  
*
pc  
*x  *C  *1p  
*
2p  
*
3p  
*
mNP  1
*
bNP  2
*
bNP  3
*
bNP  
Base example 1.96 1.96 1.96 597.11 0 0.75 2114 2618 1812 68255 66808 181391 23490 
1p
e =1.3 1.96 1.96 1.96 642.47 0 0.73 2814 2814 1948 80769 141995 177493 22655 
1p
e =1.5 1.96 1.96 1.96 581.66 0 0.79 1766 2551 1766 60090 31728 182806 23796 
6
1 10K =  1.96 1.96 1.96 608.21 0 0.82 2153 2666 1846 58386 33162 180403 23277 
6
1 3 10K = ×  1.96 1.96 1.96 542.63 1 0.46 1924 2382 1649 78271 104073 186608 24627 
1φ =1 1.96 1.96 1.96 592.47 0 0.75 2098 2598 1798 68433 67014 181811 23581 
1φ =9 1.96 1.96 1.96 601.75 0 0.76 2131 2638 1826 68079 66604 180975 23400 
1ζ =2 1.96 1.96 1.96 598.43 0 0.75 2102 2624 1816 68263 66972 181272 23464 
1ζ =12 1.96 1.96 1.96 595.83 0 0.75 2127 2612 1808 68248 66644 181506 23515 
P =150 1.96 1.96 1.96 608.25 1 0.53 2153 2666 1846 68467 66322 180400 23276 
P =250 1.96 1.96 1.96 596.69 0 0.76 2113 2616 1811 68267 66827 181429 23498 
1b
H =2 0.66 1.96 1.96 596.32 0 0.82 2112 2614 1810 68323 66843 181462 23505 
1b
H =10 3.23 1.96 1.96 597.83 0 0.70 2117 2621 1814 68195 66776 181326 23476 
1b
L =10 37.50 1.96 1.96 596.69 0 0.79 2113 2616 1811 68292 66827 181429 23498 
1b
L =1000 0.60 1.96 1.96 597.12 0 0.75 2114 2618 1812 68254 66807 181389 23490 
1b
S =20 1.96 1.96 1.96 596.52 0 0.71 2112 2615 1811 68296 66834 181444 23502 
1b
S =80 1.96 1.96 1.96 597.67 0 0.79 2116 2620 1814 68216 66783 181340 23479 
pH =1 1.96 1.96 1.96 595.67 0 0.79 2109 2612 1808 68296 66872 181521 23518 
pH =5 1.96 1.96 1.96 598.44 0 0.72 2119 2624 1816 68217 66749 181271 23464 
pS =100 1.96 1.96 1.96 596.10 0 0.69 2111 2613 1809 68325 66853 181482 23510 
pS =200 1.96 1.96 1.96 793.31 0 1.01 2801 3468 2401 61860 59700 166714 20409 
mc =100 1.96 1.96 1.96 490.52 1 0.46 1741 2156 1493 77847 72202 192268 25884 
mc =200 1.96 1.96 1.96 792.25 0 0.93 2797 3463 2398 61912 59731 166781 20422 
 # , , and b  is given in 10*1b
*
2b
*
3
-2. 
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Figure 1. The inventory levels for the product in the VMI system 
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